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EU SUGGESTED BEST PRACTICE DOCUMENT: CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EU-WIDE 
HATE CRIME LAWS 
It is appropriate to subject the various EU hate crime provisions to critical policy analysis that 
weighs up their pros and cons, and defends aspects of them from inappropriate forms of 
critique, and then draw some policy conclusions based on a sense of best practice. The aim of 
identifying best practice is to generate reform suggestions in the form of detailed model 
legislation. This is contained in the final section of this document.  
   A key point to make at the start concerns the narrow definition of protected groups under 
current EU measures. The restrictions to racist forms of hate crime and genocide denial 
contained in the Framework Decision is not central to the political and constitutional cultures 
of all member states. Indeed, it has not prevented the criminal law implementation measures 
of some EU Member States from including a number of other grounds, such as disability, 
anti-Semitism, or sexual orientation.
1
 Certain EU bodies have even encouraged this 
expansive approach to national implementation, with the FRA stating: „In the spirit of non-
discrimination, it is certainly preferable to widen criminal law provisions to include equally 
all grounds of discrimination covered by Article 14 of the ECHR or Article 21 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.‟2 This criticism would, in practice, suggest a 
need for Members State supplementing these categories with one of more the following: 
gender, social origin, genetic features, language, political or any other opinion, membership 
of a national minority, birth, property or other status, disability, age or sexual orientation.  
                                                 
1 Such extension by EU Member States to a wider range of categories of discrimination has occurred in Austria, Belgium, 
Croatia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Romania and Spain. Others, including Denmark, Hungary, 
Sweden and the UK, have included at least sexual orientation as an additional category. See FRA Report 2012, 25. 
2 FRA Report 2012, 25. 
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   Whilst supporting an expansion of the range of groups covered, the following paragraphs 
issues a cautionary warning against a massive extension to cover all these groups on grounds 
of both principle and practical consequences. 
   One clear difficulty with the FRA's proposed proliferation of protected categories is that it 
may create a situation where the specific differences demanding recognition and concrete 
response by particular victim groups are merged together into a general and relatively 
abstract category, such as „all members of any group.‟ It is arguable that each of the currently 
recognised groups encounter different issues and, not surprisingly, expect their particular and 
distinctive concerns to be both heard and responded to effectively by tailor-made measures. 
This contention is supported by the fact that representatives of each of the victim groups 
tends to campaign independently on those hate crime issues that are of particular relevance to 
their members, rather than merge forces on a common programme of action, including law 
reform.  
   The creation of such an abstract category as a result of proliferation, followed by later 
consolidation, could, therefore, prove counterproductive by failing to recognise the 
distinctive and specific issues faced by particular groups subject to hate crime victimisation, 
such as persons with disabilities.
3
 It would also frustrate efforts to render visible currently 
hidden dimensions of discrimination, including by reference to successful prosecutions. 
Furthermore, such consolidation would probably inhibit criminal courts from adapting their 
sentencing practices to specific local or regional factors. These could include a sudden rise in 
attacks on persons with disabilities that demand an effective and swift judicial response to 
concrete issues through well-publicised deterrent sentences. These would need to send out a 
clear message as to both the unacceptability of such abuse, and its possible legal 
consequences for perpetrators. 
                                                 
3 FRA Report 2012, 25 
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   Contrary to the FRA's suggestion, it also remains questionable whether, for example, 
„social origin, property or other status‟ are appropriate categories. Although probably 
appropriate for general human rights standards enforced by non-criminal administrative 
sanctions, it is doubtful whether they either can or ought to form the basis of distinctly 
criminal prosecutions or sanctions for incitement. For example, these could embrace 
comparatively routine public expressions of class-based resentment against, for example, the 
super-rich, bankers or large property owners. Such extended incitement laws could even 
apply to public and parliamentary debate over proposals for redistributive legislation 
involving the nationalisation and reallocation of land and other assets at the expense of large 
private landowners, who could then claim they are being singled out on grounds of status, 
birth or property.  
   In addition, the proposed inclusion of „political opinion‟ within the protected categories 
could be problematic. In practice, aspects of the „political opinions‟ of extremist far-right 
groups promoting fascistic racism, and less clearly certain forms of political Islam and 
Communist, are already subject to various legal restrictions at the national level at least. The 
legal validity of these restrictions have been upheld by the ECtHR in various cases involving 
genocide denial by neo-Fascists and anti-Semites on the basis that these expressions infringe 
the rights of others.
4
 In short, to include all types of „political opinions‟ as a protected 
category as the FRA propose would, therefore, generate redundancies and contradictions. 
Even from a purely anti-discriminatory perspective, these could prove counterproductive, not 
                                                 
4 Marais; Keegstra; R. v. Krymowski [2005] 1 S.C.R. 101; R. v. Zundel [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731; Lehideux v. France (case no. 
55/1997/839/1045, application no. 24662/94, Publication 1998-VII, no. 92; Garaudy v. France, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 
339-41; X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, European Commission of Human Rights 16 (July 1982); Faurisson v France, 2 
BHRC UN Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993, 1 (United Nations Human Rights Committee 1996); Chauvy v France (2005) 41 
E.H.R.R. 29; Witzsch v Germany (App. No.41448/98, April 20, 1999. For analysis of how expressions of denial fall outside 
Art 10 protections, see Hannes Canni, Dirk Voorhoof, 'The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European 
Human Rights Convention: An Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection,' 29 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 54 
(2011); Cooper and Marshall-Williams, 'Hate Speech, Holocaust Denial and International Human Rights, [1999] E.H.R.L.R. 
693; Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, „The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparision of the American and European 
Approaches,‟7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 305, 327 (1999). 
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least with respect to genocide denial. 
   The following subsections develop a critical policy analysis of the provisions regulating 
hate crime contained in the EU's Framework Decision, then the Additional Protocol to the 
Cyber-Crime Convention. 
 
Criticisms of the Additional Protocol  
Arguably, the Additional Protocol failed to reach a substantial international agreement on 
racist speech standards, and such an agreement is unlikely to be reached in the foreseeable 
future.
5
 What is more, it is doubtful whether this measure does in fact give full effect to the 
specific and relevant international and human rights measures and instruments it appeals to in 
its justification. Although it would exceed the scope of the present study to devise and then 
apply consolidated criteria of assessment of the Protocol based on these various measures, it 
is difficult to accept that this measure would fully meet such a yardstick, not least because of 
the scope of the various reservations. In addition, this measure, particularly its reservation (or 
„opt out‟) provisions can be seen as only a weak and partial response to existing Council of 
Europe conventions on co-operation in the penal field. 
   Other objections are more general. Using criminal legislation enacted under the CoE Cyber-
crime protocol against individuals risks making those individuals „martyrs‟ in the eyes of 
their communities. It could also serve to further polarise communities and exacerbate 
tensions and intolerance.
6
 In addition, there questions of law enforcement trespass upon civil 
liberty concerns and interests in that they require an unacceptable level of State intrusion and 
censorship into interpersonal communications. Liberals typically argue that censorship is the 
enemy of democratic values: there are dangerous implications and undercurrents for our hard 
                                                 
5 Rorive, 2009 op cit, 422.  
6 McMenemy, D., Poulter, A. and O‟Loan, S., 2005 op cit 501. 
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won liberties.  
   It is also possible to question whether current legal approaches to cyber hate crime are 
practical and appropriate, and the extent to which the transposition of „real life‟ regulation 
through criminal law can be effectively imposed upon „virtual life‟ regulation.7 Difficulties 
also concern problem of veracity and authenticity of Internet content.
8
 Furthermore, countries 
that are safe havens for hosting hate material might have acquired an additional sense of 
security. 
   In terms of effectiveness, it is arguable that the project of ever greater alignment of national 
criminal laws in relation to web-content may not be feasible at least in the short term because 
of the moral, cultural, economic, and political differences between the CoE Member States, 
and divergent interpretations of the meaning and proper limits of constitutionally protected 
"freedom of expression." There are likely to be disparities in the willingness of different 
nation states to take action against ISP's and the limited experience of attempting 
prosecutions in this area under national criminal law is mixed to say the least with some 
convictions in Germany being overturned on appeal.
9
 Although, it is not possible to predict 
how effective any regional transnational initiative effort like the Additional Protocol 
involving the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through 
computer systems is likely to be. Even if the project of „harmonisation‟ succeeds in the 
formal sense of all member states of the CoE both signing and ratifying this measure, it is 
                                                 
7 Audrey Guicharda, 'Hate crime in cyberspace: the challenges of substantive criminal law,' Information & Communications 
Technology Law, Volume 18, Issue 2, 2009: 201-234. 
8
 Candida Harris, Judith Rowbotham & Kim Stevenson, 'Truth, law and hate in the virtual marketplace of ideas: perspectives 
on the regulation of Internet content,' Information & Communications Technology Law Volume 18, Issue 2, 2009, 155-184. 
9 See, for example, the Criminal case of Somm, Felix Bruno, File No: 8340 Ds 465 JS 173158/95, Local Court 
(Amtsgericht) Munich. An unofficial English translation of this case is now available at www.cyberrights.org/isps/somm-
dec.htm. Other prosecutions have had mixed results. See „Ex-CompuServe Executive Convicted,‟ Associated Press (Berlin), 
28 May, 1998. However, the conviction was later quashed in November 1999: see. „Germany clears Net chief of child porn 
charges,‟ The Independent, 18 November 1999. See also the prosecution of Frederick Toben, a German-born Australian 
Holocaust revisionist who possessed an Australian passport, who denied by the German Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal 
High Court). Toben‟s website was published and maintained in Australia. See Chidi, G., „Web law blocks growth When in 
Rome,‟ InfoWorld, Vol. 23, Issue 10, March 5, 2001; Gold, S., „German Landmark Nazi Ruling,‟ Newsbytes, December 12, 
2000. 
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unlikely that the problem of internet related hate crime itself will be fully or substantially 
suppressed. Whether the language of „combating‟ racism, which implies the possibility of 
such a complete „victory‟ and „surrender,‟ is appropriate, as opposed from acting 
pragmatically to reduce the identified harm and risks to the lowest realistic levels possible, 
remains an open question. Much depends on whether racism itself is interpreted as a 
contingent and potentially temporary deviation from what is presumed to be an otherwise 
"normal" state of affairs of universal mutual respect and affirmation of difference. 
Alternatively, is it more realistic to interpret racism as a more deep-seated phenomenon 
linked, to a greater or lesser extent, to European cultural identity formation itself in which the 
affirmation of one sense of shared cultural identity involves the negation of another, its 
distinctive other?  
   Criminalisation is but one of a series of options available to address the risks and problems 
of transnational internet-based racism in a global society. Despite the possible symbolic value 
of acts of criminalisation as a policy gesture as arguably the „strongest‟ response, there is still 
the policy issue of identifying the pros and cons of each of these policy responses on the basis 
of the best available empirical evidence of the effectiveness of similar domestic measures 
introduced in the past. One of the fruitful contributions of legal expertise is to identify not 
only the possibilities but also the likely limits of legal responses deploying criminalisation 
based on prior national experiences, and to ascertain what is the optimal role for such 
responses as one part of a wider package of such measures. This package includes: ISP self-
regulation, self-regulation subject to the threat of economic state sanctions if it proves 
ineffective in practice, co-regulation, and information and education campaigns,
10
 which their 
                                                 
10 The Declaration on Freedom of communication on the Internet adopted by the COE's Committee of Ministers on 28 May 
2003 (840th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies and explanatory note, H/Inf (2003)7.) advocates self-regulation and co-
regulatory initiatives concerning Internet content, which develops . similar proposals contained in a CoE Recommendation 
(2001)on self-regulation concerning cyber-content: Recommendation Rec(2001)8 was adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 5 September 2001 at the 762nd meeting of the Ministers‟ Deputies. See the Explanatory Memorandum to 
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liberal supporters argue can be less costly, more flexible and more effective than resort to 
State legislation.
11
 
   A further question is whether it is realistic to posit the goal of "harmonisation" of the legal 
regulation of a truly global entity, such like the internet, within the context of a regional 
institution whose member states' constitutions subscribe to divergent attitudes to providing 
constitutional protection for politically defined „freedom of expression.‟ Jurisdictional issues 
related to the practicalities of enforcement and its evasion, which require close legal analysis, 
cannot be ignored. Outside the COE, states such as the USA are likely to continue to provide 
safe havens for genocide web-sites engaged in practices of genocide denial and trivialisation 
prohibited by the protocol owing to their liberal fundamentalistic interpretation of the 
meaning of „freedom of expression.‟ The difficult question arise as to whether having internet 
regulation of hate crime by criminal laws whose implementation is, in practice, weakened, 
even mocked, by the existence of such safe havens is still better than none at all?
12
 On the 
one hand, there is the symbolic re-affirmation that racist hate crime through words is contrary 
to European values and identity. On the other hand, the very idea of what counts as 
„European‟ here may be skewed towards the officially-recognised political cultures of Central 
and Western European states.
13
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Recommendation (2001) 8 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on self-regulation concerning cyber content: 
„Self-regulation and user protection against illegal or harmful content on new communications and information services.‟ 
The European Commission's Action Plan on promoting safer use of the Internet was extended to cover EU candidate 
countries, and includes research into technical means to address harmful content, as well as information and education 
campaigns. 
11 Dr. Yaman Akdeniz, An Advocacy Handbook for the Non Governmental Organisations: The Council of Europe’s Cyber-
Crime Convention 2001 and the additional protocol on the criminalisation of acts of a racist or xenophobic nature 
committed through computer systems, www.cyber-rights.org: First Published: December 2003 (Updated and revised in May 
2008) 
12 Recommendation 1543 (2001) on Racism and xenophobia in cyberspace, text adopted by the CoE's Standing Committee, 
acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 8 November 2001. 
13 The practices of certain Eastern European states may strike many Western Europeans as highly problematic. For example, 
the Czech Republic has only recently (May 2012) and following EU objections stopped its policy of „phallometric testing‟ 
for asylum procedures consisting of testing the physical reaction to heterosexual pornographic material of gay men who had 
filed a claim for asylum on the basis that they had been persecuted for their sexual orientation. Not all Member States 
acknowledge same-sex marriage. See Cecilia Malmström (European Commissioner responsible for Home Affairs) „A need 
for strong European leadership to combat discrimination‟: SPEECH/12/358: Brussels, 15 May 2012: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-358_en.htm?locale=en. Possible accession states from this region are 
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Criticisms of the Framework Decision 
The range of possible second major and more general provisions of the EU's Framework 
Decision, which the details and limitations of which will now be discussed, starting with the 
provisions for penalty enhancement. This policy is problematic insofar as the enhancement is 
not itself clearly identified, such that media publicity to individual cases can note the extent 
to which the penalty was enhanced and thereby send out a symbolic message concerning the 
especially problematic nature of hate crime relative to parallel offences lacking bias 
motivation. There are objections to how enhancement works in practice. Arguably, it sends a 
message not that bias or bigotry is intolerable in itself but that it is only intolerable in those 
who commit already established crimes. Furthermore, it also implies that those who do not 
commit this type of crimes are outside or absolved of responsibility for the reiteration of bias 
and bigotry in those who do. This is a counterproductive message given that all members of 
society need to take some responsibility for combatting racism and xenophobia 
   Whilst defending some aspects of the Decision, it is impossible to ignore the difficulties of 
other parts of this EU measure. Without reducing the criminal law response to hate crimes to 
little more than an enforcement mechanism of European-wide human rights standards, 
particularly „freedom from discrimination,‟ it is possible to identify various problems and 
difficulties with the Framework Decision.  
   Part of its stated rationale is the „harmonisation‟ of national responses through „a common 
criminal-law approach in the European Union to this phenomenon in order to ensure that the 
same behaviour constitutes an offence in all Member States and that effective, proportionate 
                                                                                                                                                        
identified as having particular issues involving the non-prosecution of hate crimes and related hate speech. See „Key findings 
of the progress reports on Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo:‟ MEMO/09/450: Brussels, 
14 October 2009: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-450_en.htm?locale=en 
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and dissuasive penalties are provided for natural and legal persons having committed or being 
liable for such offences.‟14 Given this objective, it is remarkable that member states are given 
so many opportunities through both reservation provisions and alternative options to "cherry 
pick" which aspects they find it expedient to introduce into their domestic law.  
   This would be less of an issue if these reservations were confined to fringe issues but they 
are not. The ability to limit incitement to commit hate crimes to contexts where „public 
disorder‟ is likely to result, or to opt out of such provisions altogether on the grounds of 
domestic freedom of expression guarantees, is closer to a complete negation of a core 
element of the overall legislative scheme. Even if every States Parties implement the 
Decision as fully they are required to do, the presence of the various reservations means that 
it would be possible for there to exist many different versions within EU Member States. Of 
course, such sources of variability may have been the price that had to be paid to secure 
sufficient measure of political agreement, particularly that of states with emphatic and 
entrenched „freedom of expression‟ provisions in their constitutions, which cannot be 
straightforwardly altered. Nevertheless, any such explanation should not be confused with a 
justification of its practical results. 
   It is questionable whether one of the alternatives contained in the Decision should ever 
have been authorised: the „aggravated circumstances‟ option. Indeed, it is possible to identify 
four major problems with this alternative: 
1/. Official statistics typically refer only to the specific type of crime and the penalty 
ultimately applied. As a result, even where judges factor in the bias motivation to their 
decision, this will not become visible or recorded.  
 
2/. Insofar as such motivation is reduced to just one aggravating circumstance among many 
                                                 
14 The full section of the preamble states: „Racism and xenophobia constitute a threat against groups of persons which are the 
target of such behaviour. It is necessary to define a common criminal-law approach in the European Union to this 
phenomenon in order to ensure that the same behaviour constitutes an offence in all Member States and that effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive penalties are provided for natural and legal persons having committed or being liable for such 
offences ... Since the Member States‟ cultural and legal traditions are, to some extent, different, particularly in this field, full 
harmonisation of criminal laws is currently not possible.‟ 
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others, neither court proceedings nor police reports are likely to address this element in its 
own right. In turn, this can result in such motivation being underplayed in legal decision-
making. 
 
3/. The deterrent value of this option as a way of protecting an individual‟s human dignity is 
also insufficient. This is because, unlike an enhanced penalty, the increase in sentence length 
attributable to the bias motivation is typically not made clear.
15
  
 
4/. If a state's legal situation leaves it to the individual judge‟s discretion to decide whether or 
not to take the „bias motivation‟ that forms the „aggravating circumstance‟ of a hate crime 
into account, this fails to give full effect to the unconditional obligation to „unmask‟ such 
motivation as ECtHR decisions on the implications of Article 14 require.  
  
   EU legislation prohibits unequal treatment on the basis of, among other grounds, sexual 
orientation in many areas. But combating hate crimes based on sexual orientation or gender 
identity, remains curiously neglected. This generates the curious result that a discriminatory 
failure to secure a minor promotion is taken more seriously by EU law in its specifics than, 
say, a discriminatory motivated hate crime. (Of course, national laws, and criminal justice 
responses may well not always be characterised by this discriminatory response to the 
experience of discrimination but that is not the central point in the present context.) 
   There is also the difficult question of whether those provisions concerned with the denial of 
genocides or related atrocities, which specify authorities such as the ICC, are appropriate and 
competent for this task? Arguably, it is entirely appropriate to criminalise genocide / 
Holocaust denial given the role this activity plays in violent and extremist racist movements 
eager to rehabilitate Nazism, and to insist the final decisions of properly constituted 
international criminal courts on the factual existence of such genocide be accepted. Here, we 
have a decision by an authorised and competent body establishing that, following a review 
and critical testing of relevant trial evidence, genocide (in the distinctly legal sense) has in 
                                                 
15 The FRA recently argued „Legislators should look into models where enhanced penalties for hate crimes are introduced to 
stress the added severity of these offences. This would serve to go beyond including any given bias motivation as an 
aggravating circumstance in the criminal code. The latter approach is limited in its impact because it risks leading to the bias 
motivation not being considered in its own right in court proceedings or in police reports.  
Courts rendering judgments should address bias motivations publicly, making it clear that these lead to harsher sentences.‟ 
FRA 2012 op cit, 11.  
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fact been committed.  
   A difficulty could arise, however, where it is a purely national court state of an EU member 
state that makes this decision without equivalent authorisation or justification. Recall that 
Article 1(4) authorises Member States on their adoption of the Decision to issue a statement 
that it will punish the "denial" and "trivialization" of genocide and related international 
crimes where their factual existence is accepted by a national court of the Member State in 
question. However, because of what may well be a drafting omission, these states cannot 
include in this statement that they will also punish the "condoning" of the same crimes as 
included in other articles because this word is not mentioned in the text of 1(4). Where, to 
ensure consistency with the overall spirit and implementation of the Decision, a Member 
State includes "condoning" with other states taking a more literal approach to interpretation, 
then this will prove problematic. It would add to existing issues of inconsistency between 
European States in responding to the same type of racist abuse of the memory of victims of 
mass atrocities. If the activities of "denial" and "trivialization" of a historical genocide were 
more or less equivalent to, or included "condoning," (such that the inclusion or exclusion of 
this phrase is practically redundant), then this would not be a practical issue at all. However, 
on any credible interpretation, "condoning" a past genocide, such as the Holocaust or the 
Rwandan massacres, exhibits a different, and arguably more negative and potential harmful 
attitude, than expressions of outright denial of its very existence.  
   In addition to deliberately malicious examples, denial could also stem from a perpetrator's 
ignorance alone, or from exposure to religious indoctrination, and could perhaps be combined 
with a stance of refusing to accept anything one has not experienced at firsthand. By 
"condoning" a genocide, a racist perpetrator accepts or admits that the historical acts of 
genocide did, in fact, occur but then either positively approves, or at least refuses to 
condemn, this atrocity as an unjustified activity. Arguably, this "condoning" can extend into 
13 
 
the present from an initial reference to the past, and thereby exhibit a particularly threatening 
message for current members of the victim group in question. This is because its implied 
message can be interpreted as: "all X deserved to die, and continue to merit death because of 
the fixed nature of what it intrinsically means to be X." Of course, it is possible to substitute 
for X the words, homosexual, Jew, Armenian, Bosnian Moslem, Roma etc. 
   Given the attribution of responsibility for some genocides (in the lay sense of this term) 
remains a politically-contested issue, including with respect to Bosnia, Northern Cyprus and 
the Armenians, then a Member State's decision on specific example could generate negative 
reactions and counter-reactions. Some of these might concern EU member states past 
questionable activities, particularly in some of their former colonies. For example, a decision 
by a national court of an EU member state recognising the 1915-1922 events in Armenia as 
constituting „genocide,‟ might generate extreme reactions in specific Islamic circles within 
Europe which are sympathetic to Turkey's long-standing (but historically untenable) denial of 
this historical atrocity by an Islamic regime against a Christian minority. In turn, this reaction 
to a Member State's act of recognition could, perhaps, spark religious and cultural tensions in 
parts of Europe that work against the Decision's wider policy goal of combating racism and 
xenophobia by, in the eyes of some Muslims, "inciting" these very phenomena within EU 
countries.  
   Some sense of the emotive potential of this issue, together with the "academic freedom" 
dimension, was apparent during the reaction to the writings of Bernard Lewis, an established, 
if controversial, Princeton academic historian. He had recognised the brutal facts of the 
Armenian massacre. However, he also questioned whether this massacre had, in fact, been 
expressly ordered by state officials, which is a precondition for the legal identification of a 
genocide under current international criminal law. In response to this questioning, he faced a 
successful civil law action against him for which he was ordered to pay a nominal 
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compensation for his alleged lack of „objectivity.‟16 
   As we have already shown, there are a number of ECtHR cases which highlight both the 
value but also various difficulties in criminalising those types of hate speech that take the 
form of denying or grossly trivialising an already legally recognised genocide, including the 
Holocaust.
17
 They largely succeed in striking a reasonable balance between the general 
"freedom of expression" protections, and various countervailing qualifications, duties and 
responsibilities. As already discussed, article 10(2) states that these relate to: 
„Formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of ... public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others ...‟  
 
   The positive value of these decisions, which are consistent with the Framework Decision, 
include: 
1/. Combating incitement to hatred and serious forms of racial defamation. 
2/. Counteracting the rehabilitation of the Nationalist-Socialist regime. 
3/. Preventing racist accusations against the victims of genocide that they have themselves 
falsified history. 
4/. Defending from subversion the values on which the fight against racism and anti-
Semitism are based 
5/. Combating serious threats to public order.  
6/. Safeguarding wider reciprocal respect for the standards of democracy and human rights 
infringed by such denial contained in Article 17 of the ECHR.
18
 
                                                 
16 A Paris court fined Mr. Lewis in 1995 to pay 1 (one) French Frank for having denied the Armenian genocide. The court 
further decided that Professor Lewis should also pay the amount necessary for the publication of the full court decision in the 
French daily newspaper Le Monde. See „Lewis receives adverse civil judgment,‟ Le Monde 21 June 1995: „Les actions 
engagées par les parties civiles arméniennes contre „le Monde‟ déclarées irrecevables par le tribunal de Paris‟ Le Monde, 27 
Novembre 1994: http://www.voltairenet.org/article14133.html; See also „Lewis Replies,‟ Princeton Alumni Weekly, June 5, 
1996 http://www.princeton.edu/~paw/archive_old/PAW95-96/16_9596/0605let.html#story3. 
17 See Garaudy vs France case (Application no: 65831/01, Decision on admissibility of 24 June 2003); The Garaudy and 
Lebideux and Isorni cases were prosecuted under the „Loi Gayssot‟ (Law no: 90-615 of 13 July 1990).  
18 ECHR Article 17 - Prohibition of abuse of rights: „Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any 
15 
 
   In Chauvy vs France, the ECtHR discussed the difficulties for a criminal court to decide 
upon genuinely contested historical issues where genuine historical research into events 
associated with genocide could reach different conclusions. There is an important distinction 
between acts of outright denial of judicially-determined facts of genocide, and the activity of 
debating the significance and implications of specific pieces of evidence. In this case, the 
Court insisted that:  
„it is an integral part of freedom of expression to seek historical truth and it is not 
the Court's role to arbitrate the underlying historical issues, which are part of a 
continuing debate between historians that shape opinion as to the events which took 
place and their interpretation. As such, and regardless of the doubts one might have 
as to the probative value or otherwise of the document known as „Barbie's written 
submission‟ or the „Barbie testament‟, the issue does not belong to the category of 
clearly established historical facts - such as the holocaust whose negation or 
revision is removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17 of the 
Convention.‟19 
 
 
   If we re-examine the precise wording of the relevant provisions of Article 1 of the 
Framework Decision, it is doubtful whether the language adequately respects the hard-won 
and vital legal distinctions just discussed. That is distinctions between the justifiable denial of 
judicially-established fact that a past genocide took place, and debate over the meaning and 
implications of specific details of these or associated events. The Decision criminalises: 
„c) publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes as defined in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Statute of 
the International Criminal Court ... d) ... Article 6 of the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal ... 4. Any Member State may, on adoption of this Framework 
Decision or later, make a statement that it will make punishable the act of denying 
or grossly trivialising the crimes referred to in paragraph 1(c) and/or (d) only if the 
crimes referred to in these paragraphs have been established by a final decision of a 
national court of this Member State and/or an international court, or by a final 
decision of an international court only.‟ 
 
   The vital phrase „crimes of ...‟ and „the crimes referred to....‟ and „crimes ... established by 
                                                                                                                                                        
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.‟ 
19 Chauvy vs France case (Application no: 64915/01, Judgement of 29 June 2004), para.60.  
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a final decision of ...‟ are at least potentially ambiguous. On one literal reading, they relate to 
"questions of law" in the sense of judicial findings on the meaning and scope of the offence of 
genocide. Here, the offences would embrace debates between academics concerning whether 
a programme of "ethnic cleansing" does or does not cross the legal threshold from "crimes 
against humanity" to the more narrowly-defined offence of "genocide." If one party to this 
academic controversy argues that the most recent judicial decision of, say, the ICC 
misclassifies as "genocide‟ what ought - to be consistent with past judicial precedents - more 
properly be recognised as another offence, then this argument would, on a literal reading, 
constitute "genocide denial." However, on another more purposive reading, the terms 
„crimes‟ refer to judicially-established historical „facts‟ relevant to the proof of the offences 
listed, and to „crimes‟ in the sense of instances of proven responsibility for objectively 
ascertained past events. There is little doubt that the purposeful interpretation is preferable 
and almost certainly the one intended. It certainly covers denials or gross trivialisation of 
facts by, for example, racist individuals most of whom presumably have no notion 
whatsoever as to the distinctly legal meaning of the categories of genocide and crimes against 
humanity etc., and whose hate crimes consist of absurdly claiming that the victims of racist 
genocide have falsified the historical facts and duped the Courts.  
  In short, our criticism on this point is that the wording of the Decision is that it fails to 
adequately build upon the results of relevant ECtHR decisions containing vital and useful 
distinctions for combating racist expressions whilst still avoiding excessive restrictions upon 
legitimate historical research and debate, or doctrinal controversies between international 
criminal lawyers concerning the meaning and scope of the international law categories in 
question. In other words, the Framework Decision does not adequately incorporate the 
ECtHR's clear distinction between historical events that were sanctioned with the final 
decision of an authorized international court, which are properly removed by Article 17 from 
17 
 
the protection that ECHR Article 10 provides to legitimate expression,
20
 and other historical 
events that are still open to rival interpretations and legitimate disputes by historians for 
example. The relation between the EU and the ECHR needs to be more clearly explained if 
this argument is to remain. Why should the EU incorporate the distinction made by the 
ECtHR?  
   Our next objection concerning this aspect of the Framework Decision refers to the question 
of the dubious consistency of the genocide denial provisions with the prior legal obligations 
of EU states under the Genocide Convention 1948. This Convention establishes very precise 
institutional procedures and requirements for determining whether or not an incident 
constitutes „genocide.‟21 Yet, on one reading, and in conflict with their obligations under the 
prior 1948 Convention to which Member States are still party, the Decision modifies the 
previous criteria established by this Convention. This is because it gives EU Member States 
the option of authorising their own national courts, rather than an International Criminal 
Court, to make decisions concerning whether or not a past event is to be legally recognised as 
an instance of „genocide.‟22 This gives those States which choose this option, the authority to 
punish the denial or gross trivialisation of a past event which only its own Courts have 
determined to amount to genocide. In practice, many states will not exercise this option, 
preferring their national legislation to respect the decisions of authorised International Courts. 
                                                 
20 Oetheimer, M. (2009), „Protecting freedom of expression: the challenge of hate speech in the European Court of Human 
Right‟s case law‟, Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 17, No. 3, 427-443.  
21 The authorities that will be entitled to determine whether or not an act will be legally recognised as one of genocide are set 
out in articles 6 and 9 of the Genocide Convention: „Article 6 - Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts 
enumerated in Article 3 shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act 
was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties 
which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.‟ „Article 9 - Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the 
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for 
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the 
request of any of the parties to the dispute.‟ 
22 Article 1 (d) 4 states: „Any Member State may, on adoption of this Framework Decision or later, make a statement that it 
will make punishable the act of denying or grossly trivialising the crimes referred to in paragraph 1(c) and/or (d) only if the 
crimes referred to in these paragraphs have been established by a final decision of a national court of this Member State 
and/or an international court, or by a final decision of an international court only.‟of the Framework Decision. While 
„condoning‟, „denial‟ and „trivialisation‟ are characterised as as punishable acts in paragraphs 1(c) and l(d), a different 
approach is adopted in the Article 1(4) where, possibly by accident or omission, the word „condoning‟ does not appear. 
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Nevertheless, it remains problematic that this alternative was ever provided in the first place.  
   The prospect that multiple and different national determinations of what counts as 
genocide, and thus what constitutes its denial or gross trivialisation possibly reflecting the 
different historical experiences, interests and cultural traditions of the Member States, is the 
opposite of what the stated policy of „harmonisation‟ demands. The negative practical 
consequences of such divergences, and their implications for European-wide political debate, 
are clear. If Turkey joined the EU, then its domestic criminal law prohibiting recognition of 
the Armenian tragedy as a genocide could come into conflict with one of fellow European 
States purely national judicial determination that these events of 1915-22 did in fact 
constitute genocide.
23
 Turkish citizens who either affirm or deny the Armenian genocide 
would be in violation of either domestic or European-based criminal law. 
   One could easily multiply examples of such divergence and conflict. However, the key 
point is that allowing national authorities to make such determinations without regard to the 
position in international criminal law, or even the determinations of other Member States, is 
surely the opposite of what is needed to secure the EU's stated goal of ensuring similar 
punishments for the same expressions of racism and xenophobia in each of these States. 
Furthermore, the fact that all EU states decided to become parties to a Genocide Convention, 
one of whose central aims was to ensure common transnational determinations of genocide, 
means that they are subscribers to two sharply incompatible legal measures relating to its 
judicial recognition. The lofty universalism of uniform practice valid for all states central to 
                                                 
23 This is not fanciful. On 29 January 2011, the French parliament adopted on a law that characterised as genocide 
the mass killings of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey during 1915-22. Although this law recognises the Armenian genocide, it 
does not provide for any sanction for those who deny it. On 15 July 2010, a group of socialist senators tabled a draft law that 
provided for the punishment of the denial of this genocide. However, the Legal Affairs Committee of the French Senate 
firmly opposed the inclusion of this draft law onto the agenda of the plenary 
session of the Senate. On 26 May 2011 the French Senate supported this refusal on the grounds that such a measure 
contradicted France's constitutional provisions on the freedom of expression. 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/rap-info/i1262.pdf. When adopting the Framework Decision, France stated that it 
will seek the final decision of an international court before punishing a person for the denial or „gross trivialisation‟ of 
genocide or the other international crimes referred to in the Framework Decision. 
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the 1948 Convention, which is reiterated by International Criminal Court provision, conflicts 
with the particularism of this aspect of the Decision.  
   It also sets a questionable precedent that certain non-EU states, who are also party to the 
Genocide Convention may decide to follow for purely nationalistic even racist and 
xenophobic reasons, which the EU will hardly now be in a position to challenge without 
accusations of gross hypocrisy. As a former Turkish foreign minister has threatened: 
'It [the EU] seems to be willing to develop its own criteria for the definition of 
genocide. If the EU does so, it may not be easy to prevent the Arab League, 
ASEAN, Islamic Conference Organization or other international organizations to 
develop their own criteria in their turn.'
24
 
 
Worse still, given the colonial histories of many central EU states, if any one of their national 
courts made a determination that infuriated the nationalistic sensitivities of another state, such 
as Turkey, Greece or Poland, then there could be retaliation, This could occur through the 
purported legal recognition of atrocities committed by European imperialists and colonialists 
as past acts of genocide. Given the politically-contested nature of specific genocides, 
including those stemming from the internal conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the Turkish 
invasion of Northern Cyprus and those associated with WW2, this element of the Framework 
Decision could, unfortunately, provide an issue around which renewed nationalistic 
xenophobia in some Member States could express itself and mobilise.
25
 A rather sinister, if 
not necessarily inaccurate, manifestation of this is exemplified by the following claim by 
Yakis: 
„There are more than 4 million Turks or ethnic Turks in various EU Member States. 
If the national court of one of the EU Member States takes a decision that 
characterizes the 1915 events as genocide such a decision may set the floor for the 
                                                 
24 Yaçar Yakic, „A European Union Framework Decision on the Offence of Denying a Crime,‟ 23 Review of Armenian 
Studies, 2011, 63, 86. 
25 Between 2010 and Spring 2011, there was conflict on this issue within the Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission 
(JPC) between Greek and Greek Cypriot members and those of Turkey who were promoting the French position of allowing 
determinations of genocide to be decided by international courts. For a partisan nationalistic discussion from the Turkish 
perspective. Yakic, 2011 op cit, 84-5.  
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rise of ethnic tension. It will not be unconceivable that one or more Turks or ethnic 
Turks state that they do not consider the 1915 events as genocide. If the public 
prosecutors or other zealous officials take a legal action against such a person this 
may open „Pandora's Box.‟ In other words an initiative that started in 1990s with 
the best intention to combat racism and xenophobia may become a good recipe to 
do just the opposite and to incite racism and xenophobia in the EU countries and a 
race for retaliation among EU countries and their former colonies.‟26 
 
   A different problem is that the Framework Decision is confined to race and xenophobia, 
rather than covering the remainder of what even a conservative definition of the scope of 
groups subjected to hate crimes would require. This measure addresses neither homophobic, 
transphobic violence or religious sectarian violence, nor incitement to hatred based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity. It also fails to embrace the other discrimination grounds 
recognised in Article 19 TFEU. There can be little argument that, say, for persons 
experiencing disabilities the prevalence of hate crime restricts their capacity, in practice, to 
enjoy other rights in a non-discriminatory as EU principles and law generally maintain is the 
„fundamental right‟ of all citizens. ECtHR case law addressing failures by legal authorities to 
investigate, unmask and punish bias motivation, as required by Article 14, has adopted an 
expansive approach by embracing religious as well as racial motivations for hate crime.
27
 It 
has also extended this to both disability
28
 and sexual orientation.
29
  
   Although only 'preventing and combating racism and xenophobia' is mentioned explicitly in 
Article 67 (2) TFEU, it does not follow that this needs to be treated as exhaustive of the 
competences specified in the EU Treaty.
30
 Indeed, given the more extensive reforms of many 
                                                 
26 Yakic 2011 op cit, 92. 
27 See ECtHR Milanović v. Serbia, No. 44614/07, 14 December 2010, where this court extended its case law to cover 
violence motivated by the victim‟s religious affiliation, in this case, a Hare Krishna belief. The ECtHR considers „that, just 
like in respect of racially motivated attacks, when investigating violent incidents state authorities have the additional duty to 
take all reasonable steps to unmask any religious motive and to establish whether or not religious hatred or prejudice may 
have played a role in the events.‟ Para. 96-97. 
28 Concerning disability as a ground under Article 14 of the ECHR, see ECtHR, Glor v. Switzerland, No. 13444/04, 30 April 
2009, para. 80. 
29 The ECtHR has held found that it is „undoubtedly‟ covered by Article 14. In a case concerning incitement to hatred, the 
Court emphasised that „discrimination based on sexual orientation is as serious as discrimination based on „race, origin or 
colour‟‟. ECtHR, Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, No. 33290/96, 21 December 1999, para. 28; ECtHR, Vejdeland and 
Others v. Sweden, No. 1813/07, 9 February 2012, para. 55. 
30 Peers, S., EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006: 383 and 387. 
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EU States, an extension to disability, sexual orientation and gender identity could be justified 
in EU law terms one aspect of as: 'judicial cooperation in criminal matters'. There is a strong 
case for reforming the existing restrictive range of protected groups by exploiting the 
provision of Article 83(1) TFEU that: 'on the basis of developments in crime, the Council 
may adopt a decision identifying other areas of crime that meet the criteria specified in this 
paragraph. It shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.' 
The same article, opens up the possibility of adding fresh criminal provisions to harmonise 
measures taken before, 'to ensure effective implementation'.
31
 It could be argued in the 
European Council that, far from leading initiatives in hate crime and steering Member States 
in a progressive direction consistent with core European values, including even the free 
movement of European citizens, the currently restrictive response to the range of hate crime 
victim groups lags behind developments in many member states. For example, the national 
criminal law of 12 EU Member States contain provisions making it a specific criminal 
offence to incite to hatred, violence or discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. Ten 
States make the homophobic intent an aggravating factor in the commission of common 
crimes.
32
  
   In this respect, the EU policy of harmonisation and the „approximation‟ of national criminal 
law in a progressive direction is being frustrated by the EU's own Framework Decision. This 
means that instead of looking to the Decision as the ground for encouraging EU states to 
update their national laws in a broadly consistent way, reform proposals - even from EU 
bodies such as the FRA - are forced to refer to a growing number of such laws as blueprints 
                                                 
31 Article 83(1) TFEU sub (2).  
32 See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual 
Orientation in the EU Member States: Part I - Legal Analysis, FRA, Vienna, 2008; 117 and 121. See also FRA, Homophobia 
and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the EU Member States; Part II - The Social 
Situation, FRA, Vienna, 2009. 
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for future EU reform to „play catch up.‟33 This remarkable situation is the opposite of the 
EU's self-image in this area as a central institutional driver of coordinated and progressive 
law reform. The Decision also mocks the logic of any credible „harmonisation agenda. This is 
because the Decision's restrictive protections have, for understandable domestic political 
reasons,
34
 prompted uncoordinated processes of law reform at the national level, which in 
turn multiplies both „legal uncertainty‟ and fragmentation. 
   Once again, this restrictive definition of protected groups seems to send the unintended 
message that gender-based, religious or disability-related hate crime is being placed towards 
the bottom of a clear hierarchy of victim groups.
35
 And, ironically, this is being carried out by 
a policy agenda acting in the name of EU anti-discrimination values. This curious hierarchy 
is not confined to hate crime measures but rather extends across EU anti-discrimination 
measures more generally. The term „equality hierarchy‟ is appropriate in that it recognises 
how EU anti-discrimination law more generally itself discriminates between the various 
grounds of discrimination.
36
 These include with respect to not only the material scope of the 
ban on discrimination but also in the various permitted exceptions and the rigor of required 
                                                 
33 „Following the model of (...) framework decision on racism and xenophobia (...), the European Commission should 
consider proposing similar EU legislation to cover homophobia. This EU legislation needs to cover homophobic hate speech 
and homophobic hate crime and approximate criminal legislation in the Member States applicable to these 
phenomena. Homophobic hate speech and hate crime are phenomena which may result in serious obstacles to the possibility 
for individuals to exercise their free movement rights and other rights in a non-discriminatory manner. These phenomena 
need to be combated across the European Union ensuring minimum standards of effective criminal 
Legislation.‟ FRA, Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation in the EU Member States: Part I - 
Legal Analysis, op cit, 156. Unfortunately, the FRA does not discuss the possible legal avenues open to the EU to implement 
this laudable reform suggestion, albeit one that omits both gender identity and disability where surely the same points apply 
with equal force? 
34 The contradiction of national legislators introducing discriminatory forms of anti-discriminatory measures cannot be 
expected to go unnoticed by the campaigning efforts of those NGO groups subject to hate crime who fall outside the 
privileged category of „race‟ of by wide-awake parliamentarians themselves. Even instrumental pressures, such as 
limitations of parliamentary time and already overcrowded legislative programmes encourage nation parliaments to 
introduce more comprehensive measures than the Framework Decisions requires them to do so in order to avoid having to 
revisit the issue in a predictable way in later years. The pragmatics of this comparative constitutional dimension require 
future comparative research. 
35 There have been criticisms from the European Parliament and NGOs of both this differentiate response and associated 
fragmentation. On the later, see „Written Response by ILGA-Europe to the European Commission Consultation:‟ www.ilga-
europe.org/europe/news/. (ILGA-Europe is the European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and 
Intersex Association.) Commission Communication 'Non-discrimination and equal opportunities for all - A Framework 
Strategy' (COM(2005)224 final. For the consultation material more generally, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment-social/fundamental-rights/index en.htm. 
36 Bell, M., Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002: 52-53, 211-212. 
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enforcement mechanisms.  
   At the top of the overall „equality hierarchy‟ is race discrimination for which current EU 
legislation offers the fullest and most elaborate protection covering employment, social 
security, social protection, health care, social advantages, education and access to goods and 
services, including housing. Next comes protection against sex discrimination with EU sex 
equality legislation now covering access to goods and services. Towards the bottom are other 
„new‟ legal grounds for recognising discrimination referring to religion or belief, disability, 
age and sexual orientation, which are only covered by general prohibitions of 
discrimination.
37
  
   The practical result of the equality hierarchy is that different groups subject to hate crime 
victimisation enjoy a different standard of legal protection against discrimination. 
In turn, this hierarchy of different grades of legally recognised discrimination reinforces the 
questionable political message that unequal treatment by not only hate crime perpetrators but 
also official bodies is only to be expected, even within EU „equality measures.‟ It also re-
affirms the all-too familiar message that some types of discriminatory victimisation by 
perpetrators are inherently more serious than others. Furthermore, this difference is based not 
only upon the extent of the harm inflicted on hate crime victims but depend rather upon 
which particular „protected group‟ they are identified as belonging to. Consider, for example, 
the situation of a black disabled person who has been subjected to a clearly discriminatory 
pattern of verbal and physical abuse by a gang of young people speaking a foreign language 
she does not understand.  
   To make sense of the legal significance of her situation requires references to a cluster of 
                                                 
37 As Joke Swiebel and Dennis van der Veur recognise: „the EU sends out the message that discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation and homophobic hate crimes are of lesser importance than racial discrimination and racist hate crimes. 
Needless to say, this state of affairs in no way reflects the reality of the problems as encountered in daily life throughout 
Europe.‟ „Hate crimes against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons and the policy response of international 
governmental organisations,‟ 27 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 485 (2009) 502. 
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different EU provisions and offence categories. Is she supposed to accept that any racist 
dimension is, from a criminal justice and policy standpoint, so much more important than 
hostility to her disability because criminal measures define it as such? Here, there is a risk of 
undermining not only the quality of legislation and the institutional administration of justice 
that apply it, but also citizens' sense of the transparency of their basic right not to be 
victimised on a discriminatory basis. On the other hand, it has to be frankly acknowledged 
that certain East European states, such as Poland, reject concepts such as „homophobia‟ - 
understood as a violation of basic rights demanding criminal law protection - as supposedly 
incompatible with Europe's Christian tradition and self-understanding.
38
 
   It is also questionable whether this Decision respects some of the key differences between 
transnational and national criminal law imperatives and institutional requirements concerned 
with criteria for proving individual liability through an institutional process respectful of „due 
process‟ requirements, which inevitably places suspects and offenders at centre stage, and a 
European human rights agenda. The latter focuses far more upon the violation of individual 
rights of victims and victim-groups whose definition and scope often exceeds any equivalent 
interests protected by criminal law.
39
 It is increasingly being recognised within EU legal 
circles that the harmonisation of the criminal justice systems needs to respect various specific 
features of this form of legal regulation, which is perhaps more closely tied to distinctive and 
divergent cultural traditions than other areas of regulation.
40
  
                                                 
38 In January 2006, the Polish Parliament (Sejm) responded to an EP Resolution that: „''identifying with Europe's Judeo-
Christian heritage, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland may not approve of the introduction into European Union documents 
of such notions as 'homophobia'. Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 23 June 2006 regarding the European 
Parliament resolution of 15 June 2006 on 'the increase in racist and homophobic violence in Europe'. 
39 Consider for example the following statement by the FRA: „One effect of applying restrictive criminal law definitions and 
interpretations of hate crime is that official data collection mechanisms pertaining to hate crime are „unable to capture the 
full range of victimisation experiences‟. The net effect is that official data collection mechanisms often tend to under-record 
the incidence of hate crime, which can translate into low numbers of prosecutions, thereby limiting opportunities for victims 
of hate crime to seek redress and to experience that justice is done.‟ 2012 report, 29.  
40 See Christoph J.M. Safferling, „Europe as Transnational Law - A Criminal Law for Europe: Between National Heritage 
and Transnational Necessities,‟ 10 German Law Journal, (2009) 1383: „In many respects, criminal law stands out from other 
areas of law. Availing itself of the most severe and most dissuasive tool of social control - punishments - it delineates the 
outer limits of acceptable behaviour and in that way protects the values held dearest by the 
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   The idea of extending legal protection to those who face discrimination on grounds of, say, 
property status or subscription to an unconventional political belief may appear entirely 
reasonable to a the universalistic human rights agenda championed, for example, by the FRA. 
Here, the issue could be defined as why should individuals not receive the same legal 
protection for these types of discrimination as they do for racial discrimination? However, 
this agenda reserves to itself alone the definition of rights relevant to discrimination, and 
reduces the role of criminal law to that of mere enforcement and implementation. Yet, we 
would argue that this self-evident sense of reasonableness is far from the case whenever the 
issue is viewed from a criminal law perspective concerned with both the practicalities and 
desirability of imposing state sanctions, including imprisonment, for purely verbal 
statements. These expressions could be made during the course of political debates relating, 
for example, to the selective partial or full nationalisation of remnants of feudal property 
ownership that advocate „singling out‟ only large landowners for negative institutional 
treatment. The idea that such clearly „discriminatory‟ messages ought to be criminalised as 
instances of „incitement‟ to hate crime, perhaps even framed as a „strict liability‟ offence that 
does not even require proof of intent, is incongruous to say the least.  
   So too are proposals from a „fundamental rights perspective‟ that vague and open-ended 
phrases, such as „other status,‟ can provide a legitimate basis for the imposition of legal 
sanctions, including deprivation of liberty through imprisonment. Criteria of „legal 
specificity‟ are clearly central for a criminal law approach receptive to the rights of suspects 
who are presumed innocent until found guilty by prosecutors succeeding in meeting high 
requirements of evidence and proof of charges. Furthermore, criminal law agendas typically 
insist that interpretive ambiguities in legal definitions must be interpreted in favour of 
                                                                                                                                                        
community at large. As an expression essentially of the common will, criminal penalties reflect particular social 
disapproval and are in that respect of a qualitatively different nature as compared with other punishments 
such as administrative sanctions. Thus, more so than other fields of law, criminal law largely mirrors the particular cultural, 
moral, financial and other attitudes of a community and is especially sensitive to societal developments.‟ 
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defendants. Yet, such concerns risk being characterised negatively by advocates of a 
Fundamental Rights approach as „restrictive criminal law definitions.‟  
Fortunately, the Decision itself does not promote or require the measures just set out. 
But because of its failure to clarify distinctions of approach, an august body such as the FRA, 
is able to criticise it for „failing‟ to fully adopt its own „fundamental rights‟ approach, at the 
expense of a „restrictive‟ criminal law one, that could well include such problematic 
outcomes. 
   The Decision promotes new offences of publicly inciting to violence or hatred on the basis 
of race (in a broad sense), also by public dissemination of tracts, pictures and the like, as well 
as publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. Member States may choose to punish only conduct which is either 
carried out in a manner likely to disturb public order or which is threatening, abusive or 
insulting. For other offences, racist and xenophobic motivation will be an aggravating factor.  
   The authors of the Decision wisely avoided calls to reduce European criminal law to little 
more than an enforcement mechanism for „fundamental rights.‟ However, there are a range of 
objections and challenges facing both the offences individually, the various reservations to 
which the overall package of criminalisations is subject, and the practical implementation of 
the Decision. There is still some way to go before the EU's legal and policy response to hate 
crimes could be considered coherent and consistent both within itself and, in particular, when 
placed in the context of wider EU initiatives combating already recognised grounds of 
discrimination, including disability, gender identity and sexual orientation. 
 
Conclusions 
27 
 
So far, policy responses to hate crime differ widely across European states and EU measures 
have had to make all manner of concessions to national differences by means of various 
reservations that do not bode well for the realisation of „harmonisation‟ in the EU's response 
to hate crimes. This undesirable diversity weakens the effectiveness of pan-European laws in 
this area by relying too heavily on effective national responses. That is because the 
effectiveness of policy and legal responses on national levels is often determined by cultural 
and historical factors, such as level of tolerance of hate crime - and one sometimes subsidiary 
or related element of this - hate speech, that, in turn, has been shaped by specific social and 
historical contexts, including differences stemming from the cold war polarisations. For 
instance, low social awareness and sensitivity to hate speech/crime in some countries might 
contribute to the reluctance of the victims to report them, rendering the incidents of such 
crimes less visible, underreported and, often, unprosecuted. It seems that only a coherent pan-
European hate crime framework could force through a more coordinated responses on 
national level. In turn, this could influence national cultures towards raising social awareness 
and sensitivity to such crimes. This issue seems to acquire a great urgency in the light of the 
division of Europe that ended only recently. Here we need to recognise that countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, which joined the EU and CoE only in the last two decades, 
followed a different trajectory of political and social development than that of the Western 
core, and that harmonisation is perhaps likely to be achieved only if these differences are 
more fully understood, openly acknowledged, and taken into account. 
   In terms of the specific measures themselves. Our study has identified a series of both 
technical and policy difficulties with both the Additional Protocol and the Framework 
Decision. Some of these are curious and internally inconsistent omissions, such as the weak 
provision on securing the interests and needs of victims (and other witnesses) within the 
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reaction of the Criminal Justice System relative to other comparable EU initiatives. The 
constant complaints of „underreporting‟ need to examine the reasons why the majority of hate 
crime decide not to report this ordeal to the authorities, including the perceived deterrent 
effect of various legal institutions. However, perhaps the most damaging, internally 
incoherent and potentially counterproductive of these relate to the option contained in the 
Decision of allowing each Member State to make its own determinations of the legal status of 
past genocidal atrocities because this has the potential to intensify xenophobia. 
   Our paper has also argued that the availability of so many potentially far-reaching 
„reservations‟ and exceptions have the potential to re-affirm some of the obstacles to 
enhanced „harmonisation‟ in this area rather than overcome them. It maybe that, for political 
reasons, stemming in part from the divergent cultural traditions of the Eastern European 
Member States, some of whom such as Poland, resist the very idea of „homophobic hate 
crime‟, that a further consolidation measure will ultimately be required. Hopefully this will 
not include such extensive reservations, and will reserve to international courts alone the 
competence to decide on questions of genocide. In additional such a measure will need to 
integrate the various ad hoc provisions contained in, for example the Additional Protocol, 
into a single criminal measure, and resolve the tension between that strand of EU analysis 
wedded to a „fundamental rights‟ agenda on hate crime and other more pragmatic 
perspectives that take better account of the distinctive and pragmatic imperatives governing 
the fair trial and punishment of offenders. First, however, the universalistic tendency of 
„fundamental rights‟ agenda to relegate European criminal law to little more than an after the 
fact implementation device for its own independent definitions of anti-discrimination 
measures needs to be better acknowledged and resisted if a range of difficulties and 
counterproductive outcomes identified in this paper are to be avoided. The idea of 
criminalising discrimination on grounds of „other status‟ or „property‟ is a classic example of 
29 
 
this difficulty. 
   The truth of the matter is the topic of EU responses to hate crime is an interdisciplinary 
field of inquiry where the contributions of European history, human rights (including those of 
victims and perpetrators), European policy, transnational security imperatives (including 
combating political extremism), and the relative autonomy of European and International 
Criminal Law each need to be given their due weight. The reductionist tendency to prioritise 
any one of these strands and agendas at the expense of all the others is unlikely to be fruitful. 
Finally, there is a tendency in existing debate and scholarship to assume that the EU has 
unlimited sovereignty in this area, and to disregard the specific constitutional limitations of 
this Treaty-based institution and its distinctive - if somewhat „indirect‟ - form of law-making 
in this area, which we have also sought to highlight and counter.  
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PRINCIPLES FOR EU-WIDE HATE CRIME LEGISLATION 
 
There clearly is a radical difference between some typical European and American 
approaches to the regulation of hate speech and crime crimes more generally.
41
 It is pointless, 
possibly even counterproductive, to seek to devise out universal principle grounded in 
general values of a sufficiently abstract nature to apply to every conceivable historical, 
national and regional context. On the contrary, the starting point has to be whatever can be 
shown to be contextually appropriate for a European-wide system of regulation, possibly 
respectful as far as possible of a "margin of appreciation" to accommodate strictly national 
differences and legal / constitutional traditions. This may require a limited range of 
reservations or opt outs under specific conditions.  
   There is no need to engage in policy debates with liberal fundamentalist approaches rooted 
in and emerging from the radically different political and constitutional culture of the USA, 
whose historical circumstances, ideology and political culture differ markedly from that of 
Europe. The United States did not suffer the dictatorships that blighted much of Europe, 
particularly during the 1920s and 1930s, some of which promoted a widespread anti-
Semitism and other xenophobic orientations as a populist strategy of spurious legitimation. 
(Dictatorial actions in the USA were largely directed at indigenous subsections of the 
population). Only Continental Europe has had to deal with the immediate fall out of the break 
up and implosion of the Soviet Empire and Comecon from 1989 onwards. Among these has 
been mass migration, particularly to a newly re-united Germany, accompanied by an 
                                                 
41
 There are of course high powered US based critics of liberal fundamentalism in this area whose orientation overlaps with 
that of European approaches: Owen M. Fiss , The Irony of Free Speech (1996); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words 
(1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (1993); Richard Delgado, 'Words That Wound: A 
Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name-Calling,' 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133 (1982); Mari J. Matsuda, 'Public 
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,' 87 Mich . L. Rev. 2320 (1989). 
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aggressive reaction from sectors of resident populations. On Europe's eastern side, there has 
been genocidal forms of ethnic conflict in Bosnia during the early 1990's, and in addition an 
apparent upsurge in racism, xenophobia, and hate crimes in Europe. Furthermore, there have 
been aggressively nationalist reactions against the movement toward a united European 
Union with open borders that is seen as diluting or subverting the exclusivity of longstanding 
historical national identities to which local populations have grown accustomed Given these 
contextual factors, and well-founded concerns to minimise the repetition of genocidal and 
less extreme forms of collective conflict and hostility, legal restrictions on hate crime 
including hate speech may be seen, therefore, as justifiable attempts to prohibit such hostility 
and send out a symbolic message of disapproval. 
   As we have seen both from the case studies and from the overview, the typical European 
approach is not typically committed to the liberal fundamentalist principle of value-neutrality, 
and the associated constitutional prohibition on state setting limits upon public discourse 
based on largely agreed values and standards. The one-sided ideological hostility and 
suspicion of state interventions, now generalised from an earlier dissent from an established 
state religion in the name of "freedom of conscience" into a generic and atomistic 
individualism, is not a "founding moment" of European democracies as it is in the USA, 
where the presumed intentions of the "founding fathers" have achieved an enduring mythic 
status.
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 Here, the framework revolves around a simplistic opposition between "the state" (of 
any kind) and "the private individual" deemed to be outfitted with "natural rights," including 
virtually unregulated "freedom of expression," even in areas as socially damaging as 
genocide denial, incitement to genocide and extreme pornography.
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By contrast a statement of the German Constitutional Court sums up a crucial difference 
                                                 
42 Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk 109-70 (1991). In one respect, the immediate postwar reconstruction of Europe developed 
in part in deliberate opposition to the Nazi era could be viewed as key, particularly in Germany 
43 Cf. Ronald Dworkin, 'Should Wrong Opinions Be Banned?' Independent (London), May 28, 1995, 27 or more generally 
his 'Liberty and Pornography,' N.Y. Rev. Books. 
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when it emphasised the primacy of the relationship of socially embedded citizenship: 'The 
concept of man in the Basic Law is not that of an isolated sovereign individual; rather the 
Basic Law resolves the conflict between the individual and the community by relating and 
binding the citizen into the community, but without detracting from his individuality.'
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   Instead, our survey of criminal responses to hate crime shows that the European tradition 
continues to be more concerned with working through the distinction between 
constitutionally legitimate and illegitimate forms of state power. In turn, this means 
recognising that all of us wake up every day into a pluralistic social world where important 
shared values conflict with each other, including "freedom of expression" and the equally 
important right not to suffer from discrimination, sectarian abuse and genocide.  
   In such pervasive contexts, the only appropriate response is to guard against affording any 
single particularistic value an absolute status. This applies as much as to the concern not to 
have one's religious and political faith criticised, ridiculed and attacked, as it does to the 
perceived right to express strong and critical opinions on religious and political matters.  
   The European tradition generally recognises that tolerance of difference, the right to live 
one's individual and group life differently from a contingent and socially projected "norm," 
together with the right to question the actions of both public officials and those operating 
within civil society, represent key ingredients of democracy to be constitutionally defended. 
And yet part of this defence is to set limits, enforced by the criminal law, to those expressions 
of discriminatory intolerance which work against the practical fulfilment of these aspects of 
democratic life. The key phrase in the ECHR that determines the limits of hate speech and 
which justifies their limitation through state intervention is: "necessary in a democratic 
society." Related to this is the impressive deployments of Article 17 of the European 
Convention concerning the refusal of the ECtHR to allow one convention right, such as 
                                                 
44 BVerfGE 30, 1 (20). 
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"freedom of expression," to be used to potentially undermine the possibility of individuals 
and groups benefiting from other instances of such basic entitlements, including the right not 
be discriminated against through unregulated hate speech. The vital move here, which may be 
almost is incomprehensible to a liberal fundamentalist perspective, is to interpret state 
interventions banning, say, Holocaust denial, as instances of the fulfilment of rights. In other 
words, to interpret such criminal law prohibitions as democratic obligations applicable to a 
modern European state concerned to protect the well-being of all its citizens. Whereas a 
liberal fundamentalist can only see the prohibition of such denial in terms of "censorship" and 
hence the denial of individual rights to "free speech," Europe's constitutional culture has 
shown itself to be far more sophisticated. Faced with the prospect of, say, authorities 
intervening to ban a neo-Nazi rally in a predominantly Jewish neighbourhood, the 
constitutional and legal issues become one of where to strike a difficult balance.   
   It is necessary to counterbalance claims stemming from "freedom of expression," 
association and demonstration on the one hand, and the resident's equally important 
individual and collective right not be gratuitously and wilfully insulted, defamed and 
threatened (at least at the symbolic level) on the other. 
   Another related feature of the European tradition is a pragmatic concern for the practical 
consequences of the deployment of hate crime legislation and similar administrative 
regulation. If we consider the neo-Nazi scenario just discussed, a key issue is whether the 
harm done to association and expression rights by insisting that a demonstration avoids a 
particularly sensitive neighbourhood, or becomes subject to a complete ban, is outweighed by 
the benefits to all other actually and potentially affected parties? In any particular case, it may 
be necessary to make fine judgments involving questions of the meaning and scope of 
established legal rules (including as previous interpreted and applied), general constitutional 
principles and a more concrete "weighing up" of the likely practical consequences of the 
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different options. In some cases, it may be necessary to rely on the "lesser evil" idea of 
minimising the damage to competing rights. However, in others, such as the prohibition of 
outright genocide denial and incitement to genocide, illiberal legal measures are typically 
understood as both a necessary and welcome expression and enhancement of political 
freedom, a net gain to a post-liberal conception of human rights. 
   These considerations, which probably cannot be generalised beyond the European context, 
mean that a key issue arises as to the borders of speech and the need to keep open the 
possibility of supporting and defending "illiberal" exercises of state regulation. For present 
purposes, the relevant context here is situations where individuals and groups are being 
confronted with situations and actions, including hate crimes, where their felt-entitlement to 
dignity, protection of personal identity and equal rights is being attacked, abused and 
undermined.  
   Hate speech, including genocide denial and incitement to group hatred, as well as hate 
crimes more generally, can, therefore, be interpreted by European political culture in a 
manner that emphasises their potential to damage the very core of the identities of members 
of targeted groups. The enforcement through criminal law of concepts of "group defamation," 
which are applicable even where no single individual has been specifically targeted for 
discriminatory abuse, or where there is no evidence an immediate threat of lawless physical 
violence, form an integral part of this culture. In other words, the European approach 
generally recognises a different and wider sort of harm caused by citizen's abuse of their 
powers of communication than the danger of imminent lawless action required under, for 
example, the criminal law of the USA shaped by liberal ideologies.  
   The problem identified with verbal forms of hate crime includes but surpasses a public 
order or "breach of the peace" dimension which addresses only "fighting words" provoking 
violent reaction among an audience with presumed sensibilities and physical capabilities for 
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violence. Whilst, as we have seen, certain British and German hate crime measures include a 
public order dimension sensitive to the prospect of, say, race riots that damage a wide variety 
of personal, commercial and proprietorial interests in an affected area, they are not confined 
to a narrow definition of public order considerations. In addition, they address the harm 
inflicted by discriminatory abuse upon individual members where these refuse to be provoked 
into a violent reaction, or are physically incapable of such a response or are too frightened to 
react. In other words, the definition of harm includes damage to equality rights, including 
those relating to the "dignity" and "honour" of the core identities of individual and groups, 
and their right to freely express and develop their personalities and identities without fear of 
discriminatory reactions. Whereas a liberal fundamentalist approach to such offensive abuse 
is to tell its victims not to listen or watch, and thereby placing the responsibility for the harm 
caused by, say, racist or disablist abuse upon those to whom it is targeted,
45
 the European 
approach restores responsibility, and thus legal accountability, to the human source of such 
abuse.  
   This approach adopts a more protective, interventionist orientation towards citizens who are 
not abandoned to their own isolated subjectivity and particular susceptibility to particular 
harms from others, which of course vary considerably within and between different groups. 
The European approach, of which German serves as an emphatic example, is protective of the 
group identities of its citizens. By contrast, under the liberal model individual citizens have 
an "autonomy" status forced upon them irrespective of their own decisions, orientation or 
commitments, which of course can be individualistic, group-oriented or collectivist:  
that free speech promotes certain key values such as individual autonomy and 
democracy (in that people should be able to decide for themselves which political and 
                                                 
45 In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971), the US Supreme Court held that individuals should "avert their eyes" in 
cases of offensive expression. 
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societal views should prevail). 
 
 
 
SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE POLICY BASED ON BEST PRACTICE. 
 
Our earlier analysis of the EU Member States „Laws on hate crime, including hate speech and 
genocide denial, suggested that best practice would require a modification of aspects of 
Germany‟s current legislation.  Part of this modification involves an expansion of the range 
of individuals and groups that can be specifically protected by reformed EU-wide criminal 
law. The British system certainly reflects a wider and more targeted criminal legislation but it 
is spread out over too many specific measures with incompatible criteria. Rwanda has 
provided us with perhaps the most draconian system but one which in many respects violates 
European expectations of strict legality and a concern for the human rights of defendants as 
well as the victims of hate crime and discrimination more generally. The broad and poorly 
defined categories in Rwanda‟s provisions could not be recommended for transplantation into 
EU law. Furthermore, many of the provisions could be successfully challenged under the 
ECHR not least with respect to freedom of expression and freedom of association. 
   The following “model legislation” draws upon a combination of the wider scope contained 
in the British system with respect to protected groups, whilst taking over a number of the 
categories and concepts from the German system including those that identify connections 
between hate speech and threats to democracy.  Our measures continue the tradition of 
“militant democracy.”  That is, a rejection of liberal notions of state neutrality in favour of 
provisions that reflect the need for a democratic society to be willing to protect itself and to 
refuse to allow its established systems of rights and freedoms to be turned against it in pursuit 
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of totalitarian or theocratic political agendas.   
 
Specific offences 
1. Discriminatory subversion of the preconditions for democratic practice 
It is an offence to publicly promote, distribute or otherwise disseminate defamatory beliefs, 
ideas and theories whose discriminatory content and orientation can be shown to substantially 
impede and damage the possibility of citizens being able to freely express, preserve, sustain 
and develop their identity as a group member (as defined in this measure) as well as that of a 
citizen more generally. The public glorification through words, images or symbols of the 
ideology and practices of pastor present  dictatorships that have been judicially recognised as 
having practiced institutional persecution and discrimination against existing groups as a 
matter of state policy, specifically falls within the scope of this offence.  
A/. This measure against hate speech is not intended to criminalise the holding or expression 
of non-democratic beliefs, ideas or theories as such, or acts of questioning the value of 
democracy as a form of government, where these lack any specifically discriminatory and 
clearly socially damaging content or implications. 
B/. This measure imposes purely individual liability, and provides no basis for the 
prescription of any specific organisations or bodies as such. 
C/. This measure is not designed to impede public discourse, free debate between conflicting 
beliefs, historical research or to restrict controversy within an educational and media context, 
or restrict the general description and evaluation of discriminatory ideas, beliefs and theories 
as a topic of public interest and concern. Nor does it aim to impose any orthodoxy that 
inhibits open dialogue, education and the publication of historical research within established 
academic publishing outlets subject to independent refereed quality controls prior to 
publication. The restriction on rights to expression contained in this section is only applicable 
where expressions of discriminatory ideas, beliefs and theories are being actively promoted 
as claimed justifications for current or future discriminatory practices of persecution directed 
against a specific group as defined and recognised in this measure, and in a manner clearly 
amounting to an abuse of one or more of that group's legally recognised basic rights. 
D/. Any prosecutions under this section must also be shown to be strictly necessary for the 
collective self-defence of democratic society and democratic institutions, and also strictly 
proportionate to the aims of such self-defence.  
E/. Nothing in this measure requires citizens to adopt, support and express any particular 
system of beliefs, ideas or theories as a precondition for citizenship and/or nationality or 
other public entitlements. 
F/. It is a defence to show that a public statement expressing a discriminatory belief that 
would otherwise be prohibited under this measure    positively contributed to public debates 
over the nature and direction of government policy regarding, for example, immigration and 
asylum provisions, such that its prohibition would not, on balance, serve the purpose of free 
democratic deliberation and debate. 
G/. This offence of discriminatory subversion is normally punishable with imprisonment only 
in the case of a repeat offender.unless the initial statement is of such an extreme and clearly 
damaging kind as to warrant imprisonment. 
H/. It is not necessary to show that an accused subjectively intended to commit the conduct 
prohibited under this measure, or possessed a discriminatory motivation. Liability attaches to 
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conduct that would appear to a reasonable third person to amount to negligent, reckless or 
deliberate acts. Only expressions that are shown from the circumstances to be outside the 
remit of liability for negligence and to be purely accidental and lacking any measure of 
individual  responsibility are exempt from liability. 
I/. Those who personally edit or otherwise control the content of publicly available 
expressions are liable for all prohibited materials published within their media unless it can 
be shown that reasonable and effective steps and due diligence measures were already in 
place to monitor and prevent such publication. Liability attaches to what is reasonably 
interpretable as deliberate, reckless or negligent acts and omissions by such owners, 
controllers and editors. However, there is a legal obligation under this provision to remove 
prohibited content as soon as reasonably possible once made aware of its existence. 
 
2. Genocide Denial 
It is an offence to deny, grossly trivialise, approve, justify or condone genocide or other 
international crimes judicially recognised as such by the final decision of international courts. 
The prohibited discriminatory material must also have the quality of being contemptuous of, 
or degrading to, a group who have been judicially recognised by  international court as 
having been victimised by current or past atrocities.  
A/. Member States must ensure that this ban is specifically authorised under certain clearly 
defined provisions of criminal law, preferably a single section of a criminal code that is 
specifically targeted against this prohibited type of expression.
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B/. This offence is to be interpreted and applied as a positive affirmation and legal 
enforcement of the basic right of historically victimised groups not to have aspects of their 
shared group identity defamed and insulted, or to have to witness any encouragement or 
specific incitement of a repetition of such victimisation.again, what about possibly new 
groups/change over time? 
C/. Liability under this offence does not preclude prosecution for other less specific offences 
relating, for example, to incitement to other criminal acts. 
D/. An offence is committed where the denial, grossly trivialisation, approval, justification or 
condoning is expressed in the linguistic form of a statement of fact, opinion or a combination 
of the two. E/. Only the decisions of transnational, not purely domestic, courts are relevant to 
the question of whether a particular factual atrocity legally constitutes a genocide, crime 
against humanity or other international crime. The appropriate determination needs to stem 
from a final decision of a transnational court, as opposed to judicial decisions still subject to a 
later further appeal.  
H/. The definition of international crimes is derived from judicially recognised sources of 
international criminal law and leading authoritative expert commentaries upon them.  
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 By contrast, in Germany, the "Auschwitzlolge" offense (literally, "lie of Auschwitz" offense) is 
criminalised under two sections of the German Penal Code: sections 130 and 194. 
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Discriminatory insults, threats and incitement to hostility based on perceived group 
identity 
1/. An unlawful difference of treatment is discriminatory for the purpose of this measure if it 
cannot be shown to have an objective and reasonable justification, and does not pursue a 
legitimate aim. Actions which take the form of harassment fall within the definition of 
"discrimination" where unwanted conduct related to group membership takes place with the 
purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and  creating for members of that group 
an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. Whether the 
treatment is discriminatory, or not in law, has to be determined in the light of the specific 
circumstances of the case. 2/. Verbal abuse directed against either specifically targeted 
individuals or against all members of a group that is based on the ascription of what are 
widely defined in the relevant cultural context as negative stereotypical qualities to that group 
as a whole should be punishable as a specific offence namely insult.   
a/. An "insult" is defined by reference to whatever a third person adult citizen would likely 
identify as both "seriously insulting" in those specific circumstances, and in addition, as 
clearly damaging to the established reputation, honour and dignity of the group as a whole 
and each of its members. Insults must be directed toward a person, or a group of persons 
because it appears they have been singled out as belonging to the  group in question.  
B/. The notion of insult here refers to any seriously offensive, degrading, contemptuous or 
invective expression, made available to the public, or a subsection of it, which violates the 
established reputation, honour and dignity of the group as a whole and thereby each of its 
members.  
(1) The insult must be directly connected with the insulted individual‟s perceived belonging 
to that group. 
(2) The insult must also expose members of the insulted group to a risk of likely hatred, 
contempt or ridicule from others. 
(3) The insult does not need to be expressed in the presence of a member of the targeted 
group as long as it is distributed or made available by any means to one or more other 
persons. 
 
Discriminatory threats 
 
3. Discriminatory threats of harm expressed in either private or public statements are 
offences.  
A/. A threat exists in any situation which a third person adult citizen would likely identify as 
"seriously threatening" to the targeted individual in the specific circumstances of the case 
having regard to any specific susceptibilities to harm stemming from those circumstances 
themselves. In this respect, the perpetrators of hate speech have to take their victims as they 
find them and cannot rely upon the defence that such victims ought not to have interpreted 
the statement as a threat to be taken seriously. 
B/. A threat for the purpose of this measure can include, but not be limited to, threats of 
unlawful physical violence or intimidation directed towards an individual or members of his 
or her family which would likely result in tangible harm to their well-being.  
C/. A victim is also threatened when he or she is introduced through a communication to a 
menace creating fear that the persons targeted, or their families, will become the victim of a 
recognised criminal offence for which the punishment can include imprisonment. 
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i/. The threat itself can be expressed verbally, in writing or via any other media.  
ii. To constitute an offence under this section either the content or the circumstances of the 
threat must clearly arise from, and be related to, the victim's actual or apparent membership 
of a distinct social group, as opposed to his or her purely personal qualities, past actions or 
reputation.  
iii/. The content and circumstances of the threat must potentially, or by implication, be 
reasonably interpretable as a threat to all members of the group as a whole. for example, a 
private letter sent to a family who have recently moved in to an area that has not previously 
had residents of that group, menacing them with violence constitutes a threat not only to the 
individual family, but by implication to all other members of that group  who might be 
considering moving in to that particular neighbourhood. 
iv. Where the content and circumstances of the threat are ambiguous concerning  whether or 
not a threat is discriminatory, then this doubt must be interpreted in favour of the accused. 
 
Incitement to discriminatory hostility 
 
4/. It is an offence to directly and publicly incite hostility towards any individual or group 
based on negative stereotypical qualities ascribed to that group as a whole. Incitement 
includes the direct and public advocacy and promotion of discriminatory hostility,  against a 
group  
A/. The offence contained in section 4 is an inchoate one that is fully complete when 
expressed, irrespective of any subsequent effect or influence upon others, intended or 
otherwise. It is therefore no defence for a newspaper to claim that, although its content incites 
hostility to, for example, persons with a disability, there is no available evidence of any of its 
readers acting in a hostile manner to persons with a disability as a direct result of reading this 
content.  
B/. Discriminatory Hostility is defined as any act which a third person adult citizen would be 
likely to identify as an encouragement to create or sustain a hostile environment for a 
specifically targeted group, in the specific circumstances of both the expression and its 
reception, paying due regard to relevant linguistic and cultural factors determining its 
interpretation by an audience. It is not an offence to attempt to incite discrimination but to fail 
to do so, because what is expressed in the statement lacks the necessary inciting quality as 
defined in this section. There is no liability for the intention to incite where this is not in fact 
translated into a legally identifiable act of incitement (as defined above.) 
C/. Incitement of discriminatory hostility can include (1) propaganda for imminent war or 
other forms of collective violence within or between states, with a sectarian quality and that is 
not legally justified, as for example, an act of national self-defence permitted by the UN 
Charter; and (2) advocacy of hatred between distinct social groups that is likely to result in 
tangible material harm or harms, such as those recognised as crimes against humanity, 
genocide and war crimes. The offence established by 4c(1) above is suspended during periods 
of inter-state armed conflict when two or more states are openly at war 
D/. The content of the inciting message can include any written material, image or any other 
representation of ideas or theories, capable of being communicated from one person to 
another. 
E/. Expressing beliefs and opinions that simply encourage, affirm or celebrate the positive 
qualities of a particular group as a source of pride and identity for its members is not in itself 
an offence. This is providing that this expression contains no direct or indirect discriminatory 
ascription of negative qualities to other specified groups denigrating their members as 
essentially inferior in ways that fall within this measure‟s definition of incitement, insult and 
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threat. For example, a statement affirming that it is the best thing to belong to a particular 
religion, sexual orientation or ethnic group, and to be proud of this, is not an act of hostility 
directed towards other groups.  
F/However, where this affirmation involves holding public meetings or marches in areas 
where this presence is likely to be interpreted as deliberately inflammatory, sectarian and 
divisive, and where other routes or locations are equally available, then this section becomes 
inapplicable.  This qualification is designed to protect local affected persons (whether 
resident or otherwise) from what could reasonably be interpreted as gratuitously insulting and 
threatening forms of expression, relating to their group identity. In cases where the type of 
expression involves clear assertions of religious, ethnic, national, racial superiority there is a 
presumption that these fall outside the scope of this section 
G/. It is not an offence to read or be in possession of material containing discriminatory 
incitements provided there is no attempt, successful or otherwise, to distribute these materials 
to others, and the individual concerned reveals its source 
H/. In cases of ambiguity in the application of this section, judges may obtain guidance from 
the established doctrine of international criminal law on direct and public incitement to 
genocide wherever this suggests a possible resolution of such ambiguity. 
 
5/ Discriminatory damage or destruction of property. 
 
It is an offence to commit any property related crime (as already defined by a Member State‟s 
criminal code) in circumstances that would suggest to a third party that the act exhibits 
discriminatory overtones.  Where this is proven, an enhanced penalty of between 6 months 
and two years must be imposed. 
 
Under this measure there is liability for instigation, incitement, conspiracy and aiding and 
abetting, with a maximum enhancement of 12 months imprisonment. 
 
6/ Discriminatory Offences against the Person. 
    
It is an offence to commit any offence against the person (as already defined by a Member 
State‟s criminal code) in circumstances that would suggest to a third party that the act 
exhibits discriminatory overtones. Where this is proven, an enhanced penalty of between 6 
months and two years must be imposed. 
 
Under this measure there is liability for instigation, incitement, conspiracy and aiding and 
abetting with a maximum enhancement of 12 months imprisonment. 
 
 
7/. Intent and defences 
 
In cases of proven discriminatory insults, discriminatory threats or incitement to 
discriminatory hostility, it is no defence that a perpetrator mistook the group membership of 
the victim or his or her subjective identity.  
A/. Because these offences are designed to punish behaviour that is widely recognised as 
socially damaging, the content of the subjective perceptions or beliefs of either individual 
offenders or their victims are irrelevant to the definitions of these three offences. The 
determination of guilt or innocence is independent of evidence of subjective feelings, beliefs 
and the extent of any offence taken. The legal test relates to the likely external impact of the 
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statements themselves as determined from a third person perspective.  
B/. For criminal liability, it is sufficient to establish that the insulting, threatening or 
expression of incitement was carried out as a deliberate act whatever the underlying 
subjective motivation or intention behind it. It is sufficient that a person has used for 
example, clearly racist words and symbols without having to establish that their motivation 
was partly or wholly a racist one.  
(1) There is no need to show that there was any specific subjective intent or motivation to 
insult, threaten or incite in the sense of these terms defined in this statute.  
(2) Where the court is satisfied that the act in question itself amounts to an offence, a 
presumption arises that it was carried out deliberately, which then transfers the onus of proof 
on to the accused to demonstrate that the conduct was accidental and that no blame can 
reasonably be ascribed to him or her. Only where the act in question itself is shown on the 
balance of probabilities to have been entirely involuntary and accidental, such that no guilt 
can be reasonably ascribed to the accused, will there be a complete defence in law. In 
particular, internet service providers are not liable for purely accidental examples of 
prohibited conduct where, despite evidence of due diligence, they have unknowingly hosted a 
website or newsroom containing unlawful material. However, there is a legal obligation on 
ISPs to remove this illegal content immediately once made aware of it in order to avoid 
liability for aiding and abetting the primary offence. 
(3) Where the content of a discriminatory insult, threat or incitement expressed by an 
individual is merely reported upon and published, then this repetition is not in itself unlawful 
unless the context suggests that it is likely to add to the damage caused by the original 
statement.  
(4) Where the reporting itself includes an expressly critical commentary highlighting the 
discriminatory nature of the original statement in ways that cannot be reasonably interpreted 
as denying, condoning, justifying or trivialising its implications when considered as a whole, 
then this creates a presumption against liability for journalists, academic researchers, 
educators and other commentators.  
(5) Only where the repetition would be recognised by a third party as representing a 
continuation of the specific discriminatory programme contained in and endorsed by the 
original statement will there be liability. The intentions, motivations and beliefs of such 
commentators are irrelevant to their liability.  
(6) It is a complete defence if the action was legally authorised in the sense of carried out 
under valid legal authority. Conduct prohibited by this measure may be legal or justified 
where principles or interests, such as law enforcement, court reporting, journalism or 
academic research, exclude criminal liability. Hence, the offences of discriminatory insult, 
threat or incitement only cover acts carried out without legislative, executive, administrative 
and judicial authority, where such authority clearly serves a public interest, and is consistent 
with international and European anti-discrimination measures and standards. 
 
 
8/. Definition of a group. 
 
For each offence, the necessary element of discrimination relates to a group rather than 
purely individual identity. There must be evidence that the prohibited discriminatory acts 
defined above must be directed not against any individual or collection of individuals only as 
such, but mainly or exclusively for the reason that they were identified as belonging to a 
legally recognised protected group, as set out below. 
A/. To constitute an offence the group refers to a clearly identifiable, widely recognised and 
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established section or subsection of a population. These may include, for example, groups 
distinguished by prevailing conceptions of race, skin colour, descent or national or ethnic 
origin, sexuality, disability, gender and religion into which children can be borne and acquire 
the group identity, without necessarily exercising individual choice, but can also include 
other clearly identifiable, widely recognised and established groups that meet the criteria 
contained in this section. Only exceptionally will groups established on the basis of 
temporary fashion, leisure affiliations or criminal association be recognised as such for the 
purposes of this measure.  
B/. Group membership must be capable of being identified by specific qualities widely 
recognised as distinctive and internal to it, not an absence of qualities that are irrelevant to its 
group identity, such as anyone who is not a member of X group. 
C/. There is a presumption that groups based on sporting affiliations are excluded from this 
measure without prejudice to liability under other laws. Where the insulted group in question 
comprises a form of identity based upon support for a local, regional or national sports team, 
then the provisions on insults based on that group identity alone, which are a well-established 
aspect of partisan spectator involvement in that type of sporting event, will not constitute 
offences. 
D/. Where discriminatory insults, threats or incitement is directed expressly at a group that 
falls outside the protection of this measure but where the circumstances suggest that this is 
being used as a pretext for insulting, threatening or inciting acts of discrimination directed 
against members of another group that is protected, then an offence is committed. 
E/ It is no defence to claim that only a subsection of the targeted group, such as adult females, 
were threatened, insulted or subjected to discriminatory incitement of hostility, as distinct 
from the group as a whole. Also it is no defence to claim that only members of a group living 
in a particular region were singled out for discriminatory threats, insults or incitement. 
 
9/. Sentencing 
 
For each offence, where the group is one that has been judicially recognised as suffering from 
historical persecution in the specific local, regional, national or international context in which 
the offence was carried out, a minimum level of enhanced sentence ranging from 6 to 12 
months imprisonment is mandatory.  
a/. Where the insult, threat or incitement expresses or disseminates ideas clearly based on 
racial, ethnic or religious superiority or hatred, then an enhanced sentence ranging from 6 to 
12 months imprisonment should be mandatory. 
b/. The same level of sentencing enhancement should apply to a repeat offender irrespective 
of whether the case meets the criteria for the other sentencing enhancements.  
c/. Where applicable, in a single instance all three forms of mandatory enhancement can be 
imposed cumulatively yielding a maximum total of three years in addition to the pre-
enhanced sentence. 
d/. Both individual victims of the offences of denial, insult and threat, and representatives of 
organisations speaking for the group as a whole, are entitled to provide to the court a victim 
impact statement prior to the determination of sentence.  
e/. This statement will summarise the perceived material impact of the offence upon both the 
individual victim or victims, and the group as a whole. 
f/. Where a sentence enhancement is awarded, it must be clearly and specifically identified as 
such during sentencing and expressly reported on in all official records of the trial.  
 
g/. A sentence may be modified from that which would otherwise be imposed where the 
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offence has arisen in a context of a continuing pattern of hostility between two or more 
groups to which each has contributed discriminatory insults, threats or incitement. Depending 
on the circumstances, this provision authorises both deterrent sentencing of ringleaders, 
planners, organisers and instigators of group hostility where this is necessary to end group 
conflicts, and mitigation of sentence in the case of other offenders whose insults, threats and 
incitements formed part of pattern of group self-defence. 
h/. With respect only to the offence of genocide denial, trivialisation, condoning, and 
approval, where a particular instance can be shown to be particularly damaging to democratic 
values and practices, or to amount to a particularly acute form of persecution, or to contribute 
to the programme of a potentially genocidal political or sectarian movement, then the 
sentence can be enhanced by 24 months additional imprisonment.  
i/ Sentencing should as far as possible, be based on evidence-based judicial identification of 
specific threats and levels of threat.  
 
10/. Jurisdictional questions 
Where the insult, threat or incitement is accessible through the internet, then the offence is 
committed in any jurisdiction where the statement in question is available, and constitutes a 
crime of universal jurisdiction.  
a/. The phrase universal jurisdiction has the meaning and scope attached to it by international 
criminal law. 
b/. This measure is designed to offset the possibility of comparative safe havens existing for 
perpetrators based on purely jurisdictional considerations. 
 
11/. Victim Compensation 
Following a conviction, perpetrators will also be potentially liable for a criminal 
compensation order to the individual victim or victims, or where the offence is directed to the 
group as a whole, then in favour of a charity or other welfare body supportive of all members 
of that group who meet general eligibility criteria. 
A/. Compensation may be restricted or refused where the victim has already been convicted 
of an offence under this measure within the past five years, and where the current offence has 
arisen in a context of a continuing pattern of hostility between two or more groups to which 
each has contributed discriminatory insults, threat or incitements.  
B/ Only where such an order would cause suffering to the perpetrator‟s family members will 
there be an exception. 
 
12/. Related Offences 
In addition to liability for the primary offence, there are the following forms of liability: 
1/. Attempt 
2/. Conspiracy 
3/. Aiding and abetting. 
4/. Instigation 
Each of these categories is to be given the meaning or meanings that they currently have 
within international criminal law. 
 
13/. Interpretive Guidelines 
Nothing in this measure should be interpreted as positively requiring citizens to adopt any 
specific orientation or belief system as a precondition for their citizenship. 
A/. This measure recognises that freedom of expression is a vital element of the free 
development of individual personality, the dignity and equality of the person, and rights to 
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political association, and democratic practices of self-determination.  
B/. Expressions can only be restricted through the criminal sanctions contained in this 
measure where this is clearly necessary to combat demonstrable harms stemming from overt 
forms of discriminatory conduct, as defined above, and which are clearly, actually or 
potentially damaging to the well-being of other citizens. 
C/. In any case of ambiguity in the interpretation and application of this measure, the 
implications of transnational and international measures related to unlawful forms of 
discrimination to which the majority of European states have subscribed can be consulted 
wherever this is needed to resolve conflicts of interpretation.  
D/. Ambiguities should be judicially resolved in favour of whichever interpretation is more 
consistent with the implications of these transnational and international standards providing 
this does not create manifest injustice in any particular case by, for example, imposing a 
retrospective form of criminal liability or violating other standards of strict legality. 
E. When interpreting what is necessary in a democratic society the case law of the ECHRs 
can be consulted where this is necessary to resolve an interpretive issue. 
  
14/. Reservations 
EU members‟ states can opt out of the measures if but only if: 
a/. They can demonstrate that they provide citizens with other equally or more effective civil 
or administrative remedies; and  
b/. The wording of pre-existing and entrenched constitutional measures of these states are 
manifestly inconsistent with its provisions, and that this inconsistency is of such a 
fundamental nature that it cannot, in principle, be resolved through judicial re-interpretation. 
c/ States exercising a reservation under this section commit themselves to amending the 
incompatible part of their pre-existing Constitution in such a way as to resolve the 
contradiction. 
 
